via Pitch.com
Kansas - Assistant District Attorney Jacqie Spradling was fired by District Attorney Phill Kline on April 24, 2007.
Among the items creating friction between them was her allegation that her office had been bugged. (A person not affiliated with the District Attorney's Office told Spradling that a senior member of Kline's staff had revealed that surveillance equipment was set up in the District Attorney's Office.)
Spradling claimed that she scanned her office four times with a device that detects radio frequencies from wireless eavesdropping devices. Three times, she says, the sensor detected a radio frequency signal emitted by wireless eavesdropping devices.
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Set aside the politics and names involved and assume the activity described is accurate. This is a real-life tale, that could happen to anyone, in any occupation. Consider only the actions taken when a person suspected their privacy was compromised.
• First, the target alerts the suspect. (In writing!)
• Next, the target alerts the media. (Via press conference.)
Remember, so far, there is no actual evidence of eavesdropping.
At this point, it would be reasonable to think the suspect would end the surveillance and cover their tracks.
The story now becomes murkier, and we are guessing here:
• The target, with no technical countermeasures experience, conducts their own sweep.
• The instrumentation used "detects radio frequencies from wireless eavesdropping devices."
When we hear this, it generally means that the DIY'er sweeper has gone to a "Spy Shop" or Internet site and purchased a low-cost blinky light box. The only thing these gadgets do (other than provide a false sense of security) is indicate the relative level of radio-frequency (RF) activity in an area.
Keep in mind:
• Not all eavesdropping is conducted using wireless microphones.
• A detector of this type can not verify eavesdropping; you can't listen to the signal you are detecting.
• An indication of RF may be caused by any number of things - intermittent 2-way radio transmissions from antennas on the roof a government building, for example.
It now becomes clear - this inspection methodology can not be relied upon to prove an electronic surveillance case. We are not saying that it didn't happen, just that this is not the way to make a case.
Let's go one step further with this autopsy:
• In three out of four tests, "the sensor detected a radio frequency signal emitted by wireless eavesdropping devices."
Inquiring minds want to know:
• Why wasn't the eavesdropping device searched for, found and treated as evidence of a crime - on the very first positive detection? (Eavesdropping is a criminal offense.)
• Given these preliminary findings, why wasn't an eavesdropping detection specialist (private or government) consulted?
• Why was confidential legal business allowed to continue in an office believed to be compromised with eavesdropping devices?
This is a real-life cautionary tale of how not to handle suspected eavesdropping. Don't turn your eavesdropping suspicions into front-page news. Call a specialist.
