Although South Africa is the focus of this particular article, the situation is the same in your country. Business espionage has reached critical mass. Corporate problem-o-meters are smoking...
South African companies are increasingly spying on each other as commercial competition hots up, an investigation by the International Bar Association (IBA) has found. ...indications are that SA companies are being hit by industrial espionage on a large scale.
Industry experts say it costs between R5,000 ($700.00) and R10,000 ($1,400.00) to hire a spy to install a telephone bugging device, and thereafter there is a daily fee for collecting and delivering the recordings to the client.The most common methods used by spies are the bugging of rooms and the tapping of telephones.
Eavesdropping on businesses has become easier as bugs have become more available, cheaper, more powerful and smaller. A concealed MP3 player, for example, can record days of conversation. A phone bug can be planted in a room and dialed into from anywhere — the call often escapes detection because it resembles an ordinary cellphone call.
These are “the current bugs of choice” and are readily available from electronic hobby shops and on the Internet — and are cheap enough to be disposable.
Other James Bond-style gadgets that are easily concealed include video cameras as small as a sugar cube, and fake smoke detectors with hidden wireless cameras. Some of the latest video recorders are the size of a cigarette 20-pack.
Tim Jackson (an information security expert) gave two examples of the type of thing that is happening. In one case, he found a cellphone modified to work as a bugging device that was hidden in the ceiling of a boardroom at a medium-sized insurance company in Johannesburg. The spy was able to dial into the cellphone from anywhere in the world and eavesdrop on board meetings.
In the other case, Jackson found automatic telephone recorders hidden in an unused storeroom in the parking basement of a large pharmaceutical company in Johannesburg.
Jackson said spies were switching to more sophisticated devices — such as digital recorders that can record non-stop for up to two weeks. (more)
Ready to add eavesdropping detection to your corporate security program?
Click here.
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
Monday, June 25, 2007
How Would They Know? ...(*RIM*shot*)
Research In Motion, maker of the BlackBerry mobile e-mail device, Saturday dismissed France's warning against using the product due to potential spying concerns. ... RIM has denied speculation governments may be listening in on BlackBerry traffic. (written by Ed Sutherland - AHN News Writer)
(more)(more)(RIM's Security Statement)
RIM's response to the growing word-on-the-street about the imagined (or real) eavesdropping vulnerabilities of the BlackBerry was apparently not very strong, or convincing. We see words like "dismissed" and "denied" being used to describe RIM's security state-of-mind.
Too bad. RIM has taken great pains to assure the privacy of it's service. Read the Security Statement.
This is becoming a fiasco for RIM. The RIM techies need to drag the RIM PR folks around to the back of the plant and whack them in the head with some Triple DES, quickly.
RIM, fight back. Let the public know the technical facts ...and have answers ready for these news stories. Is France bashing because they are ready to launch their own system? Is the Wall Street bashing more about stopping crooked traders than it is about outside eavesdroppers?
All this being said, remember, "Only failed attempts at espionage are discovered." So, no matter what communications system you use... use it discretely. ~ Kevin
(more)(more)(RIM's Security Statement)
RIM's response to the growing word-on-the-street about the imagined (or real) eavesdropping vulnerabilities of the BlackBerry was apparently not very strong, or convincing. We see words like "dismissed" and "denied" being used to describe RIM's security state-of-mind.
Too bad. RIM has taken great pains to assure the privacy of it's service. Read the Security Statement.
This is becoming a fiasco for RIM. The RIM techies need to drag the RIM PR folks around to the back of the plant and whack them in the head with some Triple DES, quickly.
RIM, fight back. Let the public know the technical facts ...and have answers ready for these news stories. Is France bashing because they are ready to launch their own system? Is the Wall Street bashing more about stopping crooked traders than it is about outside eavesdroppers?
All this being said, remember, "Only failed attempts at espionage are discovered." So, no matter what communications system you use... use it discretely. ~ Kevin
Spy Box Goes Postal
"A digital camera inside a parcel looks out through a small hole and captures images of its journey through the postal system.
The Spy Box was sent from my studio to the gallery taking an image every 10 seconds recording a total of 6994 images these were then edited together to create an animated slideshow." ~ Tim Knowles
Wall Street BlackBerrys Feel the Squeeze
Wall Street’s two self-policing groups, N.Y.S.E. Regulation and NASD, released proposed guidelines (NASD notice to members No. 07-30) for the regulation of written electronic communications, including information sent through BlackBerrys, text messages and instant messaging. The recommendations, which were only optional, came amid concerns about the spread of confidential information through unsecure devices.
The gist of the guidelines was that, if Wall Street firms cannot supervise or review messages from portable devices, or if the sender cannot be identified, the firms should consider blocking them. (more)(more)(in French)
The gist of the guidelines was that, if Wall Street firms cannot supervise or review messages from portable devices, or if the sender cannot be identified, the firms should consider blocking them. (more)(more)(in French)
Utility Hires PI to Spy - Eavesdrops on Lawyer
Canada - No one with the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board will be disciplined "at this time" for hiring private investigators to spy on opponents of a proposed north-south power line, a spokesman for Energy Minister Mel Knight said Thursday.
The AEUB hired four undercover investigators who pretended to be landowners to monitor the crowd. One investigator, Don MacDonald of Fort Saskatchewan, was subsequently invited to join in conference calls that linked landowners and environmentalists discussing their concerns about power-line development. In at least one of those calls, the landowners and a lawyer discussed legal strategy for an upcoming challenge before the Alberta Court of Appeal.
One of the lawyers for the landowners said Thursday that eavesdropping on solicitor-client telephone conversations will be raised with the courts in an effort to bring the AEUB hearings to a halt.
The AEUB hired four undercover investigators who pretended to be landowners to monitor the crowd. One investigator, Don MacDonald of Fort Saskatchewan, was subsequently invited to join in conference calls that linked landowners and environmentalists discussing their concerns about power-line development. In at least one of those calls, the landowners and a lawyer discussed legal strategy for an upcoming challenge before the Alberta Court of Appeal.
One of the lawyers for the landowners said Thursday that eavesdropping on solicitor-client telephone conversations will be raised with the courts in an effort to bring the AEUB hearings to a halt.
Sunday, June 24, 2007
The Danger of DIY Debugging - A Cautionary Tale
via Pitch.com
Kansas - Assistant District Attorney Jacqie Spradling was fired by District Attorney Phill Kline on April 24, 2007.
Among the items creating friction between them was her allegation that her office had been bugged. (A person not affiliated with the District Attorney's Office told Spradling that a senior member of Kline's staff had revealed that surveillance equipment was set up in the District Attorney's Office.)
Spradling claimed that she scanned her office four times with a device that detects radio frequencies from wireless eavesdropping devices. Three times, she says, the sensor detected a radio frequency signal emitted by wireless eavesdropping devices.
---
Set aside the politics and names involved and assume the activity described is accurate. This is a real-life tale, that could happen to anyone, in any occupation. Consider only the actions taken when a person suspected their privacy was compromised.
• First, the target alerts the suspect. (In writing!)
• Next, the target alerts the media. (Via press conference.)
Remember, so far, there is no actual evidence of eavesdropping.
At this point, it would be reasonable to think the suspect would end the surveillance and cover their tracks.
The story now becomes murkier, and we are guessing here:
• The target, with no technical countermeasures experience, conducts their own sweep.
• The instrumentation used "detects radio frequencies from wireless eavesdropping devices."
When we hear this, it generally means that the DIY'er sweeper has gone to a "Spy Shop" or Internet site and purchased a low-cost blinky light box. The only thing these gadgets do (other than provide a false sense of security) is indicate the relative level of radio-frequency (RF) activity in an area.
Keep in mind:
• Not all eavesdropping is conducted using wireless microphones.
• A detector of this type can not verify eavesdropping; you can't listen to the signal you are detecting.
• An indication of RF may be caused by any number of things - intermittent 2-way radio transmissions from antennas on the roof a government building, for example.
It now becomes clear - this inspection methodology can not be relied upon to prove an electronic surveillance case. We are not saying that it didn't happen, just that this is not the way to make a case.
Let's go one step further with this autopsy:
• In three out of four tests, "the sensor detected a radio frequency signal emitted by wireless eavesdropping devices."
Inquiring minds want to know:
• Why wasn't the eavesdropping device searched for, found and treated as evidence of a crime - on the very first positive detection? (Eavesdropping is a criminal offense.)
• Given these preliminary findings, why wasn't an eavesdropping detection specialist (private or government) consulted?
• Why was confidential legal business allowed to continue in an office believed to be compromised with eavesdropping devices?
This is a real-life cautionary tale of how not to handle suspected eavesdropping. Don't turn your eavesdropping suspicions into front-page news. Call a specialist.
Kansas - Assistant District Attorney Jacqie Spradling was fired by District Attorney Phill Kline on April 24, 2007.
Among the items creating friction between them was her allegation that her office had been bugged. (A person not affiliated with the District Attorney's Office told Spradling that a senior member of Kline's staff had revealed that surveillance equipment was set up in the District Attorney's Office.)
Spradling claimed that she scanned her office four times with a device that detects radio frequencies from wireless eavesdropping devices. Three times, she says, the sensor detected a radio frequency signal emitted by wireless eavesdropping devices.
---
Set aside the politics and names involved and assume the activity described is accurate. This is a real-life tale, that could happen to anyone, in any occupation. Consider only the actions taken when a person suspected their privacy was compromised.
• First, the target alerts the suspect. (In writing!)
• Next, the target alerts the media. (Via press conference.)
Remember, so far, there is no actual evidence of eavesdropping.
At this point, it would be reasonable to think the suspect would end the surveillance and cover their tracks.
The story now becomes murkier, and we are guessing here:
• The target, with no technical countermeasures experience, conducts their own sweep.
• The instrumentation used "detects radio frequencies from wireless eavesdropping devices."
When we hear this, it generally means that the DIY'er sweeper has gone to a "Spy Shop" or Internet site and purchased a low-cost blinky light box. The only thing these gadgets do (other than provide a false sense of security) is indicate the relative level of radio-frequency (RF) activity in an area.
Keep in mind:
• Not all eavesdropping is conducted using wireless microphones.
• A detector of this type can not verify eavesdropping; you can't listen to the signal you are detecting.
• An indication of RF may be caused by any number of things - intermittent 2-way radio transmissions from antennas on the roof a government building, for example.
It now becomes clear - this inspection methodology can not be relied upon to prove an electronic surveillance case. We are not saying that it didn't happen, just that this is not the way to make a case.
Let's go one step further with this autopsy:
• In three out of four tests, "the sensor detected a radio frequency signal emitted by wireless eavesdropping devices."
Inquiring minds want to know:
• Why wasn't the eavesdropping device searched for, found and treated as evidence of a crime - on the very first positive detection? (Eavesdropping is a criminal offense.)
• Given these preliminary findings, why wasn't an eavesdropping detection specialist (private or government) consulted?
• Why was confidential legal business allowed to continue in an office believed to be compromised with eavesdropping devices?
This is a real-life cautionary tale of how not to handle suspected eavesdropping. Don't turn your eavesdropping suspicions into front-page news. Call a specialist.
Saturday, June 23, 2007
Robo Audry (cure for the summertime blues)
The fly catcher is an electronic fly-swatting device based on the idea of the Venus fly trap. The Fly Catcher is not just a talking point, it actually catches flies. (more)(movie)
Eavesdropping via Mind Reading - One Step Closer
Hitachi has developed a technology to allow users to control devices by thinking. The system is currently being used to move a toy train back and forth, but the company and other manufacturers see a future for it in TV remote controls, cars and artificial limbs. A key advantage to Hitachi's technology is that sensors don't have to physically enter the brain. (more)
More GSM Cellular Bugging Devices
Check out the latest state-of-the-art GSM bugging devices
Dial into a room and listen from anywhere in the world
These products look like ordinary household devices right?
(see slide show)
Wrong.
These new products all have built-in GSM, meaning you can dial in to them from anywhere in the world and listen in to room using the GSM cellular network.
The seemingly ordinary plug is actually a 13 amp adaptor with a GSM transmitter (£998.75). Simply slot a SIM card into the adaptor, phone in to the number and the internal microphone will be activated, totally silently, allowing you to hear everything that’s happening in the room. (more)
Dial into a room and listen from anywhere in the world
These products look like ordinary household devices right?
(see slide show)
Wrong.
These new products all have built-in GSM, meaning you can dial in to them from anywhere in the world and listen in to room using the GSM cellular network.
The seemingly ordinary plug is actually a 13 amp adaptor with a GSM transmitter (£998.75). Simply slot a SIM card into the adaptor, phone in to the number and the internal microphone will be activated, totally silently, allowing you to hear everything that’s happening in the room. (more)
GSM Bug Alert
If you're hearing this on your audio systems,
it might be this...
------
A GSM cellular bug.
• Sound activated
• Motion activated
• Covert
The central feature of the GSM-SAMS, is that it’s a sophisticated, totally concealed bugging device. It calls the eavesdropper and allows them to answer & hear what is going on in the vicinity of the GSM-SAMS without alerting anyone. They can also call it.
Features:
Ability to change the pre-selected number if required
Ability to turn off microphone while on standby for power saving
Ability to remotely reset the unit.
Ability to adjust sensitivity of the microphone
Ability to remotely place the unit in "Sleep" mode.
Ability to operate up to three consecutive days on batteries. (Standby)
Compact size, easy to hide, and without range limitation (Utilizing GSM technology)
Suitable for placement in the house, car or office, etc. convenient monitoring
Three-digit identification for each unit allowing multiple-units installation
1~6: Done through text messaging.
Power: 1 Lithium Ion Battery (Lasts up to two days).
It is also possible to use a mains (for homes, office, etc.) or connect the unit to an adapter for use in an automobile.
Options:
PIR Sensor for Motion Activation. Add $118.00
External Battery: Live Monitoring & 4-5 Days Stand-by. Add $100.00
(more)
(Need help finding one of these in your office? Click here.)
Mobile phones: tapping, hacking and eavesdropping
The humble mobile phone has stepped into the murky world of corporate espionage and phone tapping.
Tales of eavesdropping and voicemail manipulation have been hitting the headlines recently, and mobile phone users -- particularly those in business -- must begin to wonder just how secure is their mobile phone?
One chief executive of a leading Irish and international blue chip company who didn't wish to be named told ENN "I just assume my mobile is monitored... (more)
Tales of eavesdropping and voicemail manipulation have been hitting the headlines recently, and mobile phone users -- particularly those in business -- must begin to wonder just how secure is their mobile phone?
One chief executive of a leading Irish and international blue chip company who didn't wish to be named told ENN "I just assume my mobile is monitored... (more)
Friday, June 22, 2007
CIA Documents Released
DC - Little-known documents now being made public detail illegal and scandalous activities by the CIA more than 30 years ago: wiretapping of journalists, kidnappings, warrantless searches and more. (more)
SpyCam Story #363
NY - A Peeping Tom who was videotaping a 14-year-old girl through her bedroom window on Thursday was arrested in her backyard, police said.
A witness saw what was going on outside the girl's home around 2 a.m. and called Nassau County police, who said images on the peeper's video camera showed he had spied on the girl at least twice.
The man was charged with multiple counts of unlawful surveillance and eavesdropping.
His video camera was confiscated and was being kept as evidence. (more)
A witness saw what was going on outside the girl's home around 2 a.m. and called Nassau County police, who said images on the peeper's video camera showed he had spied on the girl at least twice.
The man was charged with multiple counts of unlawful surveillance and eavesdropping.
His video camera was confiscated and was being kept as evidence. (more)
Story of a Cold War Debugger
Jack Glass saw plenty of action during World War II and plenty more afterward...
His services also were rendered during the Cold War, searching U.S. embassies around the world for the hidden microphones and other surveillance equipment frequently planted by Soviet spies.His specialty was "audio countermeasures," meaning he was responsible for finding hidden listening devices, or "bugs," planted by other governments in U.S. embassies, consulates and other diplomatic buildings overseas.
From 1962 to 1974, Glass was stationed at U.S. embassies in the Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and South America, serving two to three years at each location. His wife and daughters, Nancy and Jacki, traveled with him, with the children attending schools set up for diplomatic families.
From central headquarters, Glass and other security engineers would travel to U.S. diplomatic posts in surrounding countries.
"We got around pretty good," Glass said, noting that from Beirut, Lebanon, they would travel throughout the Middle East and the entire continent of Africa.
From Budapest, Hungary, they would span Eastern Europe, including Moscow and other cities in the Soviet Union. South America was covered from Buenos Aires, Argentina, while Frankfurt, Germany, was the base of operations for Western Europe.
Eastern Bloc nations, Glass said, were by far the most active.
"We found hidden microphones in all our embassies in Eastern Europe," he said, including Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Bucharest, Romania; Sofia, Bulgaria; Budapest, Hungary; Moscow and other Eastern European capitals.
"We tried to keep the embassies from being bugged," Glass said. "Sometimes we were successful, sometimes not. Whatever we could do, the Soviets could do as good or better, which they did, especially in Moscow."
Glass said hidden devices were usually found through "pick and shovel work" — physically taking apart telephones, office equipment and furniture, and even digging inside the walls, which could be up to 3 feet thick.
Glass once found a wireless transmitter inside a hollowed out piece of firewood in an ambassador's office.
A team of Navy Seabees also was assigned to assist the audio teams, since "anything we tore up we had to rebuild," Glass said. "They also helped us demolish certain things."
The searches were not a matter of paranoia — more than 130 microphones were discovered in the former U.S. embassy in Moscow, Glass said.
"It was renovated by the Russians and every office in the building was bugged," he said. "Some had been there so long the microphones didn't work."
Construction on a new embassy began in 1979 but was suspended several years later.
According to congressional documents, U.S. personnel discovered in 1984 that an unsecured shipment of typewriters for the Moscow Embassy had been bugged and had been transmitting intelligence data for years.
"In August 1985," the U.S. State Department said, "work was suspended on the partially completed (building) due to a security compromise of such consequence that there was serious doubt that the building, if completed, could be used for the purpose intended." (more)
His services also were rendered during the Cold War, searching U.S. embassies around the world for the hidden microphones and other surveillance equipment frequently planted by Soviet spies.His specialty was "audio countermeasures," meaning he was responsible for finding hidden listening devices, or "bugs," planted by other governments in U.S. embassies, consulates and other diplomatic buildings overseas.
From 1962 to 1974, Glass was stationed at U.S. embassies in the Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and South America, serving two to three years at each location. His wife and daughters, Nancy and Jacki, traveled with him, with the children attending schools set up for diplomatic families.
From central headquarters, Glass and other security engineers would travel to U.S. diplomatic posts in surrounding countries.
"We got around pretty good," Glass said, noting that from Beirut, Lebanon, they would travel throughout the Middle East and the entire continent of Africa.
From Budapest, Hungary, they would span Eastern Europe, including Moscow and other cities in the Soviet Union. South America was covered from Buenos Aires, Argentina, while Frankfurt, Germany, was the base of operations for Western Europe.
Eastern Bloc nations, Glass said, were by far the most active.
"We found hidden microphones in all our embassies in Eastern Europe," he said, including Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Bucharest, Romania; Sofia, Bulgaria; Budapest, Hungary; Moscow and other Eastern European capitals.
"We tried to keep the embassies from being bugged," Glass said. "Sometimes we were successful, sometimes not. Whatever we could do, the Soviets could do as good or better, which they did, especially in Moscow."
Glass said hidden devices were usually found through "pick and shovel work" — physically taking apart telephones, office equipment and furniture, and even digging inside the walls, which could be up to 3 feet thick.
Glass once found a wireless transmitter inside a hollowed out piece of firewood in an ambassador's office.
A team of Navy Seabees also was assigned to assist the audio teams, since "anything we tore up we had to rebuild," Glass said. "They also helped us demolish certain things."
The searches were not a matter of paranoia — more than 130 microphones were discovered in the former U.S. embassy in Moscow, Glass said.
"It was renovated by the Russians and every office in the building was bugged," he said. "Some had been there so long the microphones didn't work."
Construction on a new embassy began in 1979 but was suspended several years later.
According to congressional documents, U.S. personnel discovered in 1984 that an unsecured shipment of typewriters for the Moscow Embassy had been bugged and had been transmitting intelligence data for years.
"In August 1985," the U.S. State Department said, "work was suspended on the partially completed (building) due to a security compromise of such consequence that there was serious doubt that the building, if completed, could be used for the purpose intended." (more)
Senior Russian Cop Held in Eavesdropping Scandal
Moscow - A senior local police officer has been arrested for illegal eavesdropping, while several other officers are under probe for allegedly making phone tapping into a profitable business, according to an influential daily.
Mikhail Yanykin, deputy head of a secret police department responsible for wiretapping, covert video surveillance and other technical support operations has been apprehended pending official charges, Kommersant daily reported adding that another official Nikolai Orlov, deputy chief of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department has been ordered not to leave the city.
According to investigation phone tapping, which can be conducted as part of a criminal investigation and requires court approval, had been turned into a profitable business, with services, including printouts of tapped telephone conversations, being provided to a wide range of "clients." (more)
Mikhail Yanykin, deputy head of a secret police department responsible for wiretapping, covert video surveillance and other technical support operations has been apprehended pending official charges, Kommersant daily reported adding that another official Nikolai Orlov, deputy chief of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department has been ordered not to leave the city.
According to investigation phone tapping, which can be conducted as part of a criminal investigation and requires court approval, had been turned into a profitable business, with services, including printouts of tapped telephone conversations, being provided to a wide range of "clients." (more)
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